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EquityThis paper provides a model assessment of the role of developing Asia in the context of climate change
policies. We diagnose the potential response of Asian economies to the imposition of various climate policies,
showing that if we were to equally price carbon across the world roughly half of the abatement would occur
in developing Asia. We show that such autarkic measures would be consistent with the policy targets put
forward by the Major Economies Forum but would not necessarily be equitable. We thus propose a fragmented
cap-and-trade scheme with a speciﬁc regional market for developing Asia, the Asian Emission Trading Scheme
(Asia ETS). We assess the role of the Asia ETS on the macro-economy and international transfers vis-à- vis the
standard case of global trading. Our results indicate that creating two large trading markets would result in
small global efﬁciency losses, while at the same time generating more reasonable regional incentives and
transfers.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
It is now an established fact that the role of developing Asia will be
crucial in the context of climate change control. The rapid economic
expansion of many Asian economies has been accompanied by a
similar, and in some cases even higher, growth of energy consumption,
leading to a signiﬁcant increase of carbon intensive capital and of
greenhouse gas emissions in recent years. The most notable case is of
course China, which a few years ago became the world top emitting
country, and whose emissions in 2008 are already 25% above the
second largest emitter, the United States. It is not only China, though.
The whole region is expected to see its share of global emissions
increasing.
The stage of economic development of the region, which on
average is approaching but still below the 5000 USD/capita threshold,
believed to mark the real take-off of energy consumption, also
suggests that important carbon abatement opportunities can be
implemented before a too large fraction of carbon intensive
investments are undertaken, locking in the medium term possibilities
to shift away from a carbon intensive energy system. The region alsoattei, C.so Magenta, 63, 20123
etti).
sevier B.V.
ni, M., A developing Asia emihosts considerable potential for deployment of low carbon options
such as renewables, avoided deforestation, energy efﬁciency, and so
forth. Indeed, modelling results have highlighted the importance of
involving developing countries, and foremost Asia, in the task of
mitigation. For example, the EMF22 comparison exercise (Clarke
et al., 2009) has shown that the feasibility and costs of climate stabi-
lization would become prohibitive without an effective and prompt
collaboration between developed and developing countries.
Motivated by the increasingly alarming output of the climate
science research, policy and modelling of climate change has in recent
years increasingly focused on the assessment of stringent climate
stabilization targets, such as those consistent with the objective
of limiting temperature increase to 2 degree Celsius (2 °C) with
adequate probability. From a modelling viewpoint, the role of
technologies that allow to comply with a low future carbon budget
has received particular attention. For example, the role of negative
emissions via biomass burning and Carbon Capture and Storage
(CCS) has been shown to be very important for this class of scenarios
(see for example Azar et al., 2010), with signiﬁcant repercussions on
the economic estimates of climate policies (Tavoni and Tol, 2010).
However, translating global climate goals into regional commitments
becomes progressively more problematic with an increasing stringency
of the climate target, since a smaller carbon budget is left to be shared.
For example, in order to achieve 2 °C policies an indicative target of
−50% in 2050 (with respect to 2005 levels) has been identiﬁed. Inssion trading scheme (Asia ETS), Energy Econ. (2012), doi:10.1016/
Table 1
The scenarios.
Scenario
acronym
Scenario name Scenario description
1a Reference Business-as-usual (BaU)
2a CO2 price $10
(5% p.a.)
Low carbon tax (starting at 7$/tCO2 in 2013)
2b CO2 price $30
(5% p.a.)
Medium carbon tax (starting at 21$/tCO2 in 2013)
2c CO2 price $50
(5% p.a.)
High carbon tax (starting at 36$/tCO2 in 2013)
3a 3.7 W/m2NTE Stabilization at 3.7 W/m2 implemented as a carbon
tax
3b 2.6 W/m2OS Stabilization at 2.6 W/m2 implemented as a carbon
tax
4a Stabilization at 2.6 W/m2 implemented as a quota
system with one global carbon market
4b Stabilization at 2.6 W/m2 implemented as a quota
system with two carbon markets (ATS and Rest of
the World ETS)
2 E. Massetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics xxx (2012) xxx–xxx2009 the G8 combined this level of ambition with a target for developed
countries (−80 to −95%), thus effectively determining the obligations
of the developing world as well. Similarly, the OECD International
Energy Agency (IEA) recently stated that China's emissions need to
peak by 2020 if the world is to meet the above mentioned 2050 target.1
Not surprisingly, the reaction from developing countries has not been
favourable, as such obligations are feared to come at a cost in terms of
economic growth.
Thus, from a research standpoint, there is a need to discuss under
what conditions stringent climate targets and a reasonably just
allocation of effort can be jointly met (Tavoni et al., 2011). Asia is
the key on both fronts, since it is a fast growing and emitting region,
which also hosts a large share of the global population, including
many people still in poverty. On the front of mitigation, it is imperative
to understand the drivers of emissions in a baseline case, and to compare
this counterfactual to the abatement opportunities that the region offers.
As for the repartition of the global climate mitigation effort, it is
important to evaluate acceptable levels of regional commitments and
to design policy instruments that facilitate this process.
This paper aims at contributing to both issues. Within the context of
the Asia Modeling Exercise (AME) we run a set of coordinated
scenarios that include a baseline and a series of domestic climate
policies. We complement this analysis with the issue of burden
sharing, focusing on the role of international carbon quota policies. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we confront the standard, idealized case of a global carbon
market with one in which this coexists with a speciﬁc carbon market
for developing Asia, the Asia Emission Trading Scheme (Asia ETS).
A series of research questions are at the core of this analysis. What
is the role of developing Asia in shaping global emissions and what
are their abatement opportunities? How far is the baseline scenario
from the 2050 targets discussed in policy, and what is the regional
effort required to achieve them? How can we combine efﬁciency
and equity, while maximizing political acceptability?
Unsurprisingly, the paper falls short of providing deﬁnitive
answers to all of these important questions. Nonetheless, it strives
to provide an assessment of the role of Asia in the context of climate
stabilization that considers both the technological, economic and
equity aspects at the same time.
The paper is structured into ﬁve sections. In the next one, we quickly
describe the methodology and the set-up of the experiment. Then, we
provide a diagnosis of Asia emissions under a Business-as-Usual as
well as under domestic climate policies. In Sections 4 and 5, we present
and discuss the role of an the Asia ETS. Conclusions are summarized in
Section 6.2 In the model these are: China, India, South East Asia (EASIA) and South Asia2. Model and scenario set-up
The analysis throughout the paper is carried out with the WITCH
integrated assessment model (Bosetti et al., 2006 and www.
witchmodel.org). WITCH is an inter-temporal, optimal growth
model, with a game-theoretical set-up that allows to model multiple
externalities. In particular, it features the climate as well as the
technology externalities, the latter via international spillovers of
knowledge and experience. For the sake of this paper, the climate
policy scenarios inWITCH are run in two fashions. The cases of carbon
taxation are implemented by imposing a pre-determined carbon tax
whose revenues are fully recycled back into the economy. The cases
of emission quotas, allocated to the model 13 regions, are implemented
through a carbon trading market modelled in an iterative fashion,
through a tâtonnement process in which demand and supply are
matched by adjusting the carbon prices till the market clears. The1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/16/us-china-carbon-iea-idUSTRE66F2XC
20100716
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j.eneco.2012.02.005model generates ﬁnancial ﬂows in or out of the regions depending on
their carbon trading position and the price of CO2. Obviously, both
systems are efﬁcient because they equalize the regional marginal
abatement cost to the carbon tax in the ﬁrst case and the price of permits
in the second (which for the same target are identical). However, they
differ in that the quota system allows for compensation of the costs of
abatement by allowing ﬁnancial transfers, in proportion to the allocation
of permits.
Eight scenarios are envisaged in this analysis, as described in
Table 1. The ﬁrst ﬁve scenarios are in adherence to the ones common
to the AME exercise (Calvin et al., this issue): a Business-as-Usual,
followed by 3 carbon tax cases, with values growing at the same
interest rate but starting from different values in the ﬁrst implemen-
tation period; and two stabilization scenarios, at 3.7 and 2.6 W/m2,
also implemented as a domestic carbon tax equal for all regions. In
addition, we present two scenarios, focusing only on the most ambi-
tious climate stabilization objective (the only one compatible with a
2 °C policy), both of which implemented through an international
quota systemwith trading of permits. The ﬁrst scenario features a sin-
gle global carbon market. In the second, we consider two carbon mar-
kets, one that operates only for the developing Asia regions2 and
another for the rest of the world.
With this scenario set-up we can explore the questions raised in
the introduction, by comparing policies with different levels of
ambition (2a, 2b, 2c, 3a and 3b, 4a, 4b), or different implementation
designs (3b, 4a, 4b). All cases but the last are idealised ones because
they guarantee an efﬁcient distribution of the abatement effort
(though the only climate externality is taken care of, and thus even
these scenarios are not necessarily Pareto optimal).
In order to run the 2.6 W/m2 (450 ppm-eq) scenario, the WITCH
model had to be amended to include options that allow CO2 to be
absorbed from the atmosphere. Technically, this was done by including
the technology of biomass burning and storage of CO2 in the ground
(BECCS). Among the various carbon dioxide removal technologies,
BECCS is considered to be a promising one, though only provided
sufﬁcient land is available to avoid clashed with other, arguably more
fundamental, competing claims on land. Negative emissions technologies
are key to achieving low carbon stabilization scenarios (Clarke et al.,(SASIA). South East Asia largely corresponds to the East Asia & Paciﬁc region of the
World Bank. We exclude China; we include New Caledonia, Brunei, French Polynesia,
Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Singapore, all in the World Bank non-OECD high in-
come region. South Asia includes: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
ssion trading scheme (Asia ETS), Energy Econ. (2012), doi:10.1016/
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Fig. 1. Global, energy related CO2 emissions.
3E. Massetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics xxx (2012) xxx–xxx2009), but are also highly speculative ones. Their inclusion thus signiﬁes
this is a technology optimistic modelling set-up.
The cost of the biomass feedstock is determined by WITCH on the
basis of regional supply cost curves obtained by the land use
GLOBIOM (Havlik et al., 2010) model. GLOBIOM accounts for residual
emissions associated with the full life cycle of growing, harvesting
and transporting the biomass. The power generation technology is as-
similated to integrated gasiﬁcation of coal, with speciﬁc penalties on
costs and performance obtained from the techno-economic literature
(Azar et al., 2006; Gough and Upham, 2010; Hansson et al., 2009;
IEAGHG, 2009; Rhodes and Keith, 2005).3 As for the storage of CO2,
the model features endogenous regional supply cost curves with no
limits to the total absorption potential.
3. Diagnosing the response of Asian economies to carbon policies
We begin by analysing the results of the ﬁrst 6 scenarios, those
shared with the AME exercise. The results in terms of global emission
pathways are reported in Fig. 1. WITCH Business-as-Usual (1a) foresees
a continued use of fossil fuels and thus substantial growth in emissions,
which reach a plateau at the end of the century. On the other hand, the
various climate policies have a profound, and distinctively different,
impact on the emissions proﬁles. Even the more lenient carbon tax
(2a) is able to reduce emissions considerably, with a peak year around
mid-century, when the carbon tax is set at about 40$/tCO2. This is a
result of the inter-temporal nature of the model, that anticipates the
exponentially growing tax value (which for 2a reaches 500$/tCO2 at
the end of the century). As expected, increasing the level of the tax
increases abatement and anticipates the peak year of emissions, though
the abatement gains are less than proportional, as a results of the non-
linear marginal abatement costs of the model and the fact that the tax
are also raised non linearly (the medium tax is roughly 3 times higher
than the low one, and the high tax only 1.6 times the medium one).
Both the medium and high taxes allow energy CO2 emissions to be zer-
oed at the end of the century.
In terms of global climate change implications, the carbon taxes
provide substantial reductions of concentrations of greenhouse
gases (GHGs), with the medium and high taxes being able to lower
them below those of the less stringent stabilization scenario (3a),
though in both cases the concentration target consistent with a 2 °C
policy (scenario 3b) is missed. It also interesting to observe that for
both of the two higher taxes, as well as for the more stringent
stabilization scenario, maximum GHGs concentrations are attained
before the end of the century, meaning that they lead to so-called
overshoot trajectories (Table 2).
Turning our attention to the speciﬁc case of developing Asian coun-
tries, Fig. 2 provides a snapshot of the abatement that the 5 AME cli-
mate policy scenarios have on the 4 Asian regions.4 As expected,
given its size in terms of both population and economic activities,
China is the country where the largest absolute emissions reductions
occur. India is second, followed closely by South-East Asia: this is a re-
gion hosting roughly half of the population of India (almost 650 million
people in 2005), but with a total economic activity which is now some
25% higher than the Indian one, given the more advanced stage of de-
velopment of countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia etc. It is
also a region with plentiful abatement opportunities, especially for
what regards avoided deforestation and bio-energy.3 Investment cost in integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle (IGCC) coal power plants
is equal to 3172 USD/kW, 3.0–1.5 times higher than the investment cost used in the
model for traditional pulverized coal power plants. We assume that biomass is used to-
gether with coal. In 2015 the amount of biomass cannot exceed 20% of total fuel use. In
2050 the share exogenously grows to 57% and in 2100 biomass can be used alone. The
efﬁciency of IGCC power plants is equal to 0.4 when used only with coal. It is 0.35 if
used with biomass only. The capture rate of CCS is equal to 90%.
4 For a detailed analysis of BaU and carbon tax emissions scenarios with the WITCH
model for China and India see Massetti (2011) and Carraro and Massetti (2011).
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j.eneco.2012.02.005Similarly to what was shown for the global picture, the abatement
brought about by the medium (2b) and high taxes (2c) resembles that
of the two stabilization scenarios (3a, 3b) respectively. The milder tax
achieves roughly half and one third of the mitigation of the same
scenarios respectively. In terms of total contribution of the developing
Asian regions to global abatement, the share of global abatement is
surprisingly constant across all the 5 climate policy scenarios. China
provides roughly 30% of global mitigation, the rest of developing Asia
17%, and the remaining is equally split among OECD countries and the
rest of the world.
The impact of the climate policies on regional mitigation can also be
appreciated in Fig. 3 and in Fig. 4, where we focus on the year 2050, an
important signpost for policy. The charts show how the various policies
are able to progressively reduce emissions with respect to today's
levels. It is instructive to notice that the stringent stabilization scenario
3b entails emission reductions which are in line with the proposal of
the G8 and Major Economies Forum: global emissions are roughly
halved by 2050, and the OECD takes on an obligation close to 80%
(Fig. 3; see also Carraro and Massetti, 2011; Massetti, 2011).
Thus, according to our numerical assessment, the G8 burden sharing
proposal for 2050 is one in which a 2 °C consistent policy is implemented
through domestic action achieved by uniformly pricing carbon across the
world. As already noted, this scheme could sidestep the question of a just
and fair allocation of allowances to emit, and has been criticized by
developing countries exactly on these grounds.
Fig. 4 displays the percentage deviation of emissions from the BaU
in the 5 AME scenarios and reveals the large mitigation effort that
developing Asia must do to comply with the proposed G8 and MEF
scheme. With bustling economies and growing populations all regions
have a fast growing demand of energy which causes a constantly rising
pattern of emissions. The 3b scenario requires them to cut emissions
abruptly from the BaU trend. China and East Asia must reduce emis-
sions by roughly 80%, as the OECD economies. India's progress on mit-
igation would seem modest if emissions in 2050 were compared to
their level in 2005 (Fig. 3); quite the opposite, it entails a remarkable
70% contraction with respect to the BaU.Table 2
GHGs concentrations expressed in ppm of CO2eq.
1a 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b
GHGs concentrations in 2100 (ppme) 942 633 521 492 563 460
Highest level of GHGs concentrations,
2005–2100 (ppme)
942 633 550 526 563 497
ssion trading scheme (Asia ETS), Energy Econ. (2012), doi:10.1016/
2a 2a 2a 2a2b 2b 2b 2b2c 2c 2c 2c3a 3a 3a 3a3b 3b 3b 3b
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
G
tC
O
2-
eq
India China SouthAsia SouthEastAsia
Fig. 2. Cumulative emissions abatement (2010 to 2050) in the developing Asia regions for the 5 AME policy scenarios.
4 E. Massetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics xxx (2012) xxx–xxxTable 3 displays other measures of effort for the scenario 3b in
2050. Despite Asian countries reducing total emissions less than the
OECD with respect to 2005, they undertake a tremendous effort at
per capita level. In 2050, the average Developing Asia citizen cannot
afford to emit as much as in the OECD. The Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) loss induced by the carbon tax (with lump-sum revenue
recycling) is lower in the OECD than in China and in South-East
Asia, with India falling shortly below. The income per capita gaps
between developed and developing countries narrow in 2050 in the
BaU scenario, but still remain wide. For example, China's and India's
per capita income (measured in market exchange rates) are equal
to only 30% and 10% of the average income in the OECD, respectively.
Therefore the same percentage GDP loss entails a much larger welfare
burden in poorer economies.
Finally, we run a thought experiment and examine what would
look like an economy in which carbon is taxed at extremely high
prices and revenues are recycled lump sum. On average, each citizen
will pay the carbon tax on her emissions (e.g. 1.3 tCO2 in India) at the
current carbon price. We deﬁne the ratio of carbon taxation over per
capita income as the “carbon tax burden”. The average Chinese citizen
will pay roughly a quarter of her revenue in carbon taxes compared to
only the 4% in the OECD. It is true that at the end of the month she will
receive a check in the mail with a lump-sum transfer from the
Government. However, the sheer size of the carbon tax is huge in
Developing Asia and dominates all economic activities at personal
and national level, a plausible source of confrontation, social unrest
and a true managerial challenge.
Thus, the claim of developing countries that the G8/MEF proposal
put forward in 2009 is not fair is actually conﬁrmed by our modelling-100%
-50%
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Fig. 3. Change in emissions in 2050 with respect to 2005 in the developing Asia regions
for the 5 AME policy scenarios.
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j.eneco.2012.02.005experiment. An alternative that would preserve efﬁciency but would
allow for a more equally distributed commitment is of course that
of implementing the climate policy not through equal, domestic
carbon taxes, but rather through a quota system with the possibility
to trade CO2 permit allowances. This is itself plagued by several
deﬁciencies, and in the next section we turn to the discussion of trad-
ing schemes and on whether and how it is possible to ﬁnd a
compromise between efﬁciency and equity.
4. The Asian Trading Scheme (ATS)
In Section 3 we highlighted the importance of the Asian region for
both the climate change problem and for its solution. According to the
scenarios generated by theWITCH model, by mid-century developing
Asia will account for more than 40% of global GHGs emissions. In the
same year, and across all the climate policy scenarios considered thus
far, developing Asia would also account for roughly 50% of global
mitigation of GHGs. This simple snapshot emphasizes the importance
of involving the region into the global effort of climate mitigation, or
otherwise it won't be effective.
However, our analysis has also shown that achieving stringent
climate stabilization targets such as those compatible with limiting
temperature increase below 2 °C (scenario 3b here) by means of
homogenous carbon taxation across regions without redistribution—
similarly to what proposed at the policy level by the industrialized
nations—is likely to be incompatible with a reasonable deﬁnition of
just allocation of effort. As a result, it is unlikely to be endorsed by
the developing Asian countries.-90%
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Fig. 4. Change in emissions in 2050 with respect to the BaU in the developing Asia
regions for the 5 AME policy scenarios.
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Fig. 5. Cumulative carbon budget (2005 to 2050) for the C&C allocation scheme in com-
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5 It should be noted that developing countries outside Asia would on the other hand
be subject to a higher marginal cost. The implications for their economies, though, de-
pend on the allocation: the higher price is indeed likely to be beneﬁcial whenever, as
for the case of this scheme, these countries are net sellers of permits.
Table 3
Indicators of effort for the scenario 3b in 2050 across regions.
China India South
Asia
South-
East
Asia
OECD World
Emissions per capita
(tCO2-eq/cap)
3.1 1.3 1.9 1.2 3.6 2.4
GDP losses in 2050
(% change wrt the BaU)
5.5% 3.4% 2.6% 4.8% 3.6% 5.5%
Carbon tax burden
(carbon tax as % of per cap income)
27% 11% 23% 6% 4% 9%
5E. Massetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics xxx (2012) xxx–xxxTwo potential solutions can be envisaged as a way out of this
impasse. One possibility would be to keep abatement domestic, but
diversify the level of effort by differentiating the carbon taxes, with
higher values in the developed countries and lower in the developed
ones. This, however, would come at the cost of efﬁciency: by no
longer equalizing the marginal abatement costs, the global economic
cost of the policy would be higher. Given the potentially high costs
required to achieve stringent climate targets, this doesn't seem a
palatable option. The alternative would be to keep equalizing marginal
abetment costs by implementing a quota system in which allowances
of CO2 permits can be traded among countries, the mechanism
promoted in the Kyoto protocol. A well-designed, global cap-and-trade
system has the potential to create the right incentives to engage
developing countries (Frankel, 2008).
However, this last policy instrument is also subject to a series of
limitations. It could involve potentially large ﬁnancial transfers across
countries. These ﬂows might be substantial and arguably controversial.
For example, De Cian and Tavoni (2011) found that the size of north–
south side-payments would be very sizeable, and that restrictions on
CO2 trading would likely result. Furthermore, a well-functioning carbon
market requires a solid infrastructure that guarantees the integrity of the
transactions and provides market participants with reliable information.
Issues of monitoring, reporting, and veriﬁcation would emerge, and in
this respect the experience with the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) has not been encouraging (Wara and Victor, 2008). Solving
these issue might take a long time and is likely to delay the establish-
ment of a global carbon market.
The alternative that we set to analyze in the remaining of the
paper is a compromise between efﬁciency and equity that foresees
the regionalization of carbon markets. Although this is not a new
concept, to our knowledge it has mostly been analyzed for the case
of Europe and the US (e.g. linkage of the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme and the regional or federal US proposed systems),
but never for developing Asia (Flachsland et al., 2008; Gruell and
Taschini, 2010; Jaffe and Stavins, 2008; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2010;
Sterk et al., 2009; Tuerk et al., 2009). Speciﬁcally, we study the case
of two separate carbon markets: one that would be exclusive to de-
veloping Asian countries (China, India, South Asia and South-East
Asia), and another one for the rest of the world.
Carbon permits cannot be exchanged within these two markets.
Thus, two prices of CO2 are likely to emerge, with a consequent loss
of efﬁciency. Nevertheless, this loss is likely to be smaller than the
case of the differentiated carbon prices region by region, since
considerable trading of emission permits among regions in the two
markets would occur nonetheless. In addition, in a world with
multiple externalities, it is possible that these efﬁciency losses due
to the misallocation of abatement could be compensated by a
correction of the distortion due to the technology spillovers. For
example, using the same model, De Cian and Tavoni (2011) have
shown that mild restrictions on the use of international carbon offsets
would induce only moderate losses of efﬁciency.
In order to implement this scheme, the WITCH model has been
modiﬁed to accommodate two emission trading schemes (ETS). The
iterative process now adjusts both prices to ﬁnd an equilibriumPlease cite this article as: Massetti, E., Tavoni, M., A developing Asia emi
j.eneco.2012.02.005between demand and supply. With this set-up, we can compare the
case of a quota system with a global carbon market (scenario 4a)
and with two regional markets (Asia and Rest of the World ETS,
scenario 4b). We consider the same overall climate objective as in
scenario 3b, namely the most stringent 2.6 W/m2 (roughly
450 ppm-eq), which is also the one most widely discussed in policy.
Regarding the rule for allocating CO2 allowances to regions, a crucial
input to the analysis, we choose the contraction and convergence
one (C&C): with this rule emission permits are initially allocated on
the basis of historic emissions; after a gradual transition, permits
are allocated on the basis of population (equal-per-capita) in 2050
(Meyer, 2000). Although this is a recognized scheme that has been
widely applied, many others could be considered. Because the
distribution of abatement, and therefore the price of carbon in the
market, is largely independent from the allocation of permits, alternative
rules would only change the net position of a region in the market.
The carbon budget consistent with this scheme is shown in Fig. 5
face to face with the case of the BaU. It stands clear that substantial
emission reductions would be needed by the OECD, China and to a
less extent South-East Asia. For the poorer (in CO2 per capita terms)
Asian countries, India and South Asia, the scheme would require
essentially no cumulated abatement in the ﬁrst half of the century.5. A numerical economic assessment of the ATS
We begin the numerical evaluation of the Asia ETS by examining
the path of carbon prices in the two scenarios, as reported in Fig. 6.
The ﬁgure shows that in the case of two carbon markets, two quite
distinctive set of prices emerge: the Asian market has a price which
is essentially zero till 2035, and till 2050 remains lower than the
unique price that is set in the global carbon market (scenario 4a,
which is obviously equal to the carbon tax in scenario 3b). On the
other hand, the carbon price in the ETS for OECD countries and the
Rest of the World (RoW) market is higher. The ‘exchange rate’ be-
tween the two carbon prices in scenario 4b changes over time, as
the Asian carbon permits appreciate with respect to the non Asian
ones, and actually cross them in value in the second half of the centu-
ry (not shown in the ﬁgure). But for the whole next 40 years, the mar-
ginal cost of CO2 remains lower in the developing Asia region, because
of its overall milder commitment and its plentiful abatement oppor-
tunities. This result goes into the aimed direction of differentiating
the abatement costs in favour of the less developed countries.5ssion trading scheme (Asia ETS), Energy Econ. (2012), doi:10.1016/
6 Between 2050 and 2065, a gain is observed. This is not surprising, given that the
WITCH model features multiple externalities and is thus consistent with potential pol-
icy induces welfare improvements.
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6 E. Massetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics xxx (2012) xxx–xxxThe two different markets also change the trading positions and
associated ﬁnancial transfers across countries. Fig. 7 provides
information on the inﬂows and outﬂows in the carbon market for
the only developing Asian countries, in the case of a single and of
two carbon markets. The ﬁgure shows that the big sellers of permits
(India, East Asia and South-East Asia) would receive very sizeable
ﬁnancial transfers in exchange of emission mitigation, of up to 2 trillion
USD in 2050. Such a ﬁgure is signiﬁcantly reduced in the case of the Asia
ETS, both as a consequence of the lower price of permits seen above, but
also because of the lower demand, which in this case would come only
from China and not from the industrialized countries. For example, the
three selling regions in Asia sell in 2050 3.2 GtCO2 in the case of a global
market, and 1.9 GtCO2 in the case of the Asia ETS. China increases the
share of abatement abroad because without the competition of high
income countries emissions allowances from other Asian countries
become cheaper.
As expected, this has implications at the macroeconomic level.
Fig. 8 reports the percentage deviation of GDP from its BaU level, in
the 4a scenario (global cap-and-trade) and in the 4b scenario (Asia
ETS). The left panel considers 2050 alone, the right panel considers
discounted GDP change over the 2015–2050 time interval. With the
Asia ETS South Asia (SASIA) and India still have beneﬁts, but
considerably smaller than in the global trade scenario. The Asia ETS
reduces the cost of reaching the mitigation target by nearly 20% in
China, in 2050. Cumulative discounted costs decrease by about 30%.
With the Asia ETS, East Asia (EASIA) lacks instead a sufﬁciently
wide outlet for the emissions credits that the region can generate
with avoided deforestation and afforestation activities. As a result
we ﬁnd that EASIA suffers from (small) net costs in 2050. If we
consider a longer time horizon the position of EASIA remains mostly
unchanged. Interestingly, the cost for OECD economies remains
largely unaffected in 2050. Costs increase instead from 1.0% to 1.4%
over the 2015–2050 time horizon. As for the RoW, at mid-century
they are one of the largest beneﬁciaries of the carbon market separa-
tion, with a gain of about 20%. Still positive, even if less pronounced, is
the impact over 2015–2050. Yet, GDP losses remain high, mostly as a
result of the terms of trade losses of energy exporting countries
whose falls in oil revenues bear large macroeconomic consequences.
The cost reductions in 2050 are mostly a result of the larger sales of
carbon of regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Latina America,
who have abundant resources of land use mitigation options, including
ones that allow absorbing CO2 from the atmosphere (such as BECCS).
At global level, in 2050, the cost of climate policy does not change
when there are two separate markets; discounted costs increase by 15%.
This result is quite powerful and indicates that developing Asia
can be considered self-sufﬁcient in terms of emission allowances. It
is therefore conceivable to create a developing Asia “bubble” that
allows a regional redistribution of a macro-regional target, as it
happens now for the European Union. It is of course possible toPlease cite this article as: Massetti, E., Tavoni, M., A developing Asia emi
j.eneco.2012.02.005conceive more complex, welfare enhancing, allocations of the regional
target than the one considered in this study. The choice of the regional
distribution would be more ﬂexible, managed at regional level and
adjusted over time.
Fig. 9 expands the analysis of two separate carbon markets on
global GDP. The chart shows that the efﬁciency loss is rather small
till 2065, though it rapidly increases in the late part of the century
when emission reduction targets become ambitious and policy costs
are very substantial: as a result, the reduced ﬂexibility in abating
emissions due to the market separation generates a higher penalty.
One might well conceive, though, that the two markets could merge
at some point, especially given the long time frame analysed here.
Thus, from a policy view point the most important result from this
chart is that, at least globally, splitting the global carbon market in
two large sub-units has a relatively modest cost until 2050.6
Finally, one of the main advantages of creating a regional market
for emissions allowances is in fact the possibility of fostering
cooperation among developing Asia countries. Regional climate
negotiations might include many other issues, like technological and
economic cooperation, intra-regional trade, etc.
By linking climate and other issues it is possible to strengthen the
stability of the developing Asia coalition and to enhance its role in the
global negotiation game (see for example Barrett, 1997; Carraro and
Siniscalco, 1995, 1997; Cesar and de Zeeuw, 1996; Folmer et al.,
1993). It should be remarked, though, that the Asia ETS would only
partially address the incentive compatibility of climate cooperation.
For some countries, such as India and South Asia, the policy beneﬁts
would be lessened. Previous analysis with the same model used in
this paper has indeed shown that creating self sustaining climate co-
alitions which are stable and effective is very difﬁcult (Bosetti et al.,
2009).
6. Discussion and conclusions
The active participation of developing Asia to the international
effort to control global warming is crucial. The largest fraction of the
incremental growth of GHGs is expected to come from the developing
countries of Asia. If the present trend is not changed, it will be
impossible to achieve even moderate climate policy targets.
In fact, the world is asking developing Asia to engage in extremely
ambitious emission reduction policies. This paper shows that the G8
and MEF pledge to reduce global emissions by 50% in 2050 implicitly
assumes that developing Asia must cut emissions by 70–80% with
respect to the BaU scenario. The size of the contraction needed with
respect to the BaU is a good indicator of the level of effort required
to fast growing developing economies.
This paper also examines other indicators of the stringency of the
2050 target. Emissions per capita, the “tax burden”, the macroeconomic
GDP loss, indicate that the distribution of effort implied by the G8 and
the MEF target falls disproportionately on developing Asia and other
developing nations. Since G8 countries have already committed to
severe emission reductions, our analysis shows that the pledge to
reduce global emissions by 50% in 2050 is extremely ambitious.
There is without doubts a trade-off between an equitable burden
sharing and the climate objective. It is therefore of utmost importance
to refocus the discussion on equitable and realistic distribution of
effort.
Ideally, any global stabilization target can be achieved by means of
any distribution of international emission permits, if global trade is
allowed. The market guarantees an efﬁcient solution, independently
from the initial distribution. However, it is hard to conceive that a
global carbon market will exist in the ﬁrst half of the century. Thession trading scheme (Asia ETS), Energy Econ. (2012), doi:10.1016/
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7E. Massetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics xxx (2012) xxx–xxxﬁnancial ﬂows towards developing countries might be unsustainable
from a political and economic point of view. In addition, it will be
hard to ensure a smooth and transparent functioning of the market
for the obvious difﬁculties in monitoring and veriﬁcation of the emis-
sion credits. A solution with only autarchic action, which however
takes care of equity issues, is equally not desirable because of the in-
efﬁciencies that arise as a consequence of very large disparities
among carbon prices internationally.
For those reasons many advocate the creation of regional carbon
markets, with the possibility to link them with different degrees of
interconnection. This paper contributes to this literature by introducing
the concept and assessing the potential of a developing Asia Emission
Trading Scheme (Asia ATS). We envision the creation of an Asian
“bubble” that is distributed among countries at a regional negotiation
level. The Asia ATS would resemble very much the European Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).
This paper shows that the advantages of building a regional
market for emissions in Asia are many. First, under a contraction-
and-convergence allocation scheme, which was used as a prototype
for a fair international allocation of effort, developing Asia appears
to be self-sufﬁcient with respect to the rest of the world, at least
until 2050. Thus, treating developing Asia as a single block in
international negotiations would not create large international
unbalances. Second, the reduced competition for cheap abatement
opportunities in Asia reduces the price of carbon in the region. This
has obvious beneﬁcial consequences for China, which is the regional
net importer of emission credits. It has however also indirect
beneﬁcial implications for the large exporters of emission permits: a
lower price and lower volumes in the market reduce the ﬁnancial
inﬂows in exporting countries to a politically and economically
acceptable level. Third, the Asia ETS increases only marginally the
cost of climate policy in OECD economies, which increases the
political acceptability of this scheme. Finally, a regional emissions
“bubble” would foster cooperation among developing Asia countries.-5%
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j.eneco.2012.02.005Issue linkage would become more concretely possible, given the
many areas of cooperation that already exist among many countries
in the region.
China is going to be the large regional leader in the future and will
also play a major role in the Asia ETS. Being the country with the
higher level of per capita emissions and one of the highest levels of
income per capita, China would be a net buyer in the market. Without
the interference of OECD economies it would enjoy greater access to
regional cheap abatement opportunities and reduce considerably
mitigation costs. At the same time, China would have a unique
possibility to contribute to the regional development. Large, CDM-
like, emission reductions project might be associated to bi-lateral
agreements on economic and technological cooperation. At the
same time China would also have greater responsibilities. From
being a follower in global climate policy, it would become a leader
of the regional climate policy, with all the burden to monitor and ver-
ify regional progresses.
Some caveats apply to our analysis. First, we used a very simpliﬁed
allocation scheme. Many others are possible and the research of the
Pareto optimal allocation is left for future research. Second, the Asia
ETS might not be implementable due to the lack of sufﬁciently strong
regional institutions. The confrontation on distribution issues might
exacerbate, rather than alleviate, regional contrapositions, especially
between China and India. Third, our analysis deals only with the
ﬁrst part of the century. Preliminary results show that developing
Asia might become a net importer of emission permits as the stringency
of the target increases enormously at the end of the century.
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